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This paper uses the neoclassical growth model to evaluate the size of distortions associated with 
different monetary and fiscal policies designed to finance government expenditures in the presence of 
administration costs.  The model is calibrated to match important features of U.S. data, and used to 
evaluate welfare costs of monetary and fiscal policies.  We find that the presence of administration 
costs increases the welfare costs of government policies involving different combinations of taxes on 
capital and labour income, consumption and money holdings.  In addition, the welfare implications of 
tax reforms designed to replace the taxes on labor or capital income with less distorting forms of 
taxation are altered.  Another implication of the results is that in economies with larger costs of 
administration, revenue replacement through seigniorage would be a more attractive option than other 
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the steady state welfare implications of monetary and fiscal policies 
within the framework of a neoclassical growth model in which administration of taxes is costly.  The 
model studied here is a simple extension of Cooley and Hansen’s (1992) work, which evaluates the size 
of distortions associated with government policies involving different combinations of taxes on capital 
and labor income, consumption and also the implicit “inflation tax” on the holdings of money.  As in 
the Cooley and Hansen paper, we construct an artificial monetary calibrated to U.S. data, and compute 
the welfare gains from tax reforms that are designed to replace the tax on capital and labor income with 
other forms of taxation. 
   Introducing administration costs of taxation may be important for obvious reasons.  Firstly, we would 
expect welfare costs of policies to be higher.  Secondly, given that there are no administration costs 
associated with inflation, it is of interest to examine whether tax reforms involving replacing the capital 
or labor taxes with the inflation tax are associated with relatively lower welfare costs. 
    As we will show, the presence of administration costs of taxation yields larger estimates of the 
welfare costs associated with each of the policies considered in the benchmark model without 
administration costs.  In addition, the ranking of alternative policies is altered.  Specifically, policies 
that replace capital and labor taxes with the inflation tax yield larger welfare gains relative to policies 
that replace them with the consumption tax.  This seems to be consistent with some recent empirical 
evidence which suggests a negative correlation between seigniorage and other forms of taxation.  See 
for example, Click (2000), and Kenny and Toma (1997).  A further implication of the model is that 
economies with larger costs associated with tax administration might find the inflation tax a more 
attractive option than other forms of taxation.  
      In the next section of the paper we present the model economy.  In Section 3 we discuss the 
calibration of the model, and the method used to compute the welfare costs associated with various 
policies.  The results of the welfare analysis are presented and discussed in Section 4.  Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2.  The Model 
The economy described below is a version of the dynamic general equilibrium model of Cooley and 
Hansen (1992), modified to incorporate administration costs of taxation.  There is a continuum of 
identical infinitely lived households, with preferences described as follows: 
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Here the variables  t c1  and  t c2  represent the household’s period-t consumption of “cash” and “credit” 
goods respectively.  The cash good can only be purchases using previously accumulated cash balances.  
This ensures that money is valued in the equilibrium.  Hours worked  t h  enter the utility function in a 
manner consistent with the "indivisible labor" assumption in Hansen (1985).  Households maximize (1) 
subject to the sequence of budget and cash-in-advance constraints respectively given by 
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and 
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In equation (2)  t x  is investment, and  1 + t m  is the amount of money balances to be carried over to the 
next period.  The sum of household consumption, the amount paid to the government in the form of the 
consumption tax, ct τ  investment and money carried over cannot exceed the after-tax labor and capital 
income, previously accumulated cash balances and transfers from the government which are 
respectively represented by the terms on the right hand side of (2). Specifically,  ht τ  is the tax on 
labour, t w  is the wage rate,  kt τ  is the tax on capital  t k , and  t r is the rental rate of capital.  The third 
term reflects the depreciation allowance built into the tax code, whereδ  is the rate at which capital 
depreciates.  The last term represents lump sum transfers from the government.  Also, household 
investment expenditure in period-t is given by 
                                    ) 4 ( 1 0 . ) 1 ( 1 < < − − = + δ δ t t t k k x  
   The representative firm in the economy hires labor and capital from the households to produce a 
composite consumption-investment good.  There is a standard neoclassical aggregate production 
function of the Cobb-Douglas form, which combines capital () Kt  and labor input () Ht  to yield output 
() Yt
1: 
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      The competitive firm maximizes profit, which is given by Yw Hr K tt t t t − − . The first order 
conditions for the firm’s profit maximization problem imply that wt  and rt  are given by: 
                                        ) 6 ( ; ) 1 (
θ θ θ
− − = t t t H K w  
                                                 ) 7 ( .
1 1 θ θ θ
− − = t t t H K r  
The government raises revenue in order to finance government expenditures  t G  by imposing taxes and 
creating money.  The government’s monetary policy involves issuing money according to the following 
rule: 
                                          ) 8 ( . ) 1 ( 1 1 t t t M M + + + = µ  
The government’s revenue through seigniorage is then given by  t t t P M / 1 + µ , where  1 + t µ is the 
monetary growth rate.  The fiscal policy of the government involves the taxation of consumption, labor 
and capital income and is subject to the constraint that the present value of expenditures must equal the 
present value of revenues.  The government’s budget constraint is therefore given by 
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1 Capital letters denote aggregate economy wide per capita variables which an individual household regards as 
being outside its sphere of influence, while lower case letters denote variables specific to the household. 
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The parameters  , , k h ξ ξ  and  c ξ  represent the proportion of tax revenue’s from labor, capital and 
consumption that are left over after costs involved in the administration of these taxes have been 
incurred.  Also,  t t t C C C 2 1 + = . 
   For a value of  µ greater than one, both  Mt  and  t P  will grow without bound.  In order to make the 












P = ˆ .  We also restrict our focus to policies under which government expenditures, 
tax rates, and money growth rates are constant over time. The household’s problem can then be 
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Where the three equations above are the transformed versions of the household budget and cash-in-
advance constraints and the government budget constraint.  In addition, the household’s problem must 
be consistent with the aggregate economy-wide resource constraint, the law of motion for the aggregate 
capital stock, and the perceived functional relationship between the aggregate per capita state variable 
and investment, hours worked and the price level
2. 
 
3.  Calibration of the Model and Computation of Welfare Costs 
In this section we first briefly describe the measure of welfare costs used.  In order to compute welfare 
costs of any given policy, we calculate the percentage change in consumption that is required in order 
to make the household’s steady-state utility equal to that which would obtain when all distortionary 
taxes were removed and the monetary growth rate were set equal to zero.  In particular, we solve for 
x in the equation 









1 ,c c , and 
* h are the consumption and labor allocations under the policy in question, and U  
represents the utility level attained when there are no taxes and zero money growth.  Solving the above 
equation yields  












                                                 
2  We do not state all these conditions and define the competitive equilibrium explicitly as the 
equilibrium concept here is analogous to the one in Cooley and Hansen’s (1992) paper.  TAX DISTORTIONS IN A NEOCLASSICAL MONETARY ECONOMY 
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  We now describe the calibration of the model.  Since we wish to maintain comparability with our 
benchmark Coley and Hansen model, we choose the same parameter values as in that study.  In 
particular, we let  50 . 0 , 23 . 0 , 0 , 02 . 0 , 36 . 0 , 84 . 0 , 6 . 2 , 99 . 0 = = = = = = = = k h B τ τ µ δ θ α β , and  0 = c τ .  
Regarding the administration cost parameters, accurate estimates that correspond to the interpretation 
that would be applicable to  k h ξ ξ , , and  c ξ are, to our knowledge, not available.  We therefore set 
ξ ξ ξ ξ = = = c k h , and then let ξ be a free parameter.  Specifically, we consider two values forξ , 0.9 
and 0.8, which imply that administration costs account for 10% and 20% of revenues respectively.  
 
4.  Welfare Analysis of Alternative Policies 
  In this section we first compare the welfare costs of various policies that are designed to raise the 
same amount of revenues in the benchmark model with no administration costs.  These policies involve 
different combinations of taxes on consumption and money growth, and a “base policy” with the tax 
and money growth parameters described in the previous section.  Next, we preform the same analysis 
for the model with administration costs that are 10% and 20% of revenues respectively.  The results of 
these steady state experiments are presented in Tables 1, 2, and 3, and Figures 1 and 2. 
  Table 1 replicates the steady state experiments of Cooley and Hansen (1992), and Tables 2 and three 
presents the same experiments with 10% and 20% administration costs respectively.  The columns of 
these tables show the tax rates and money growth rate corresponding to the policies in question.  The 
first row in each of these tables computes the welfare costs of the base policy, which is associated with 
an average labor tax rate of 23% and a capital tax rate of 50%.  The money growth rates, consumption 
taxes and lump-sum transfers in this case are zero.  The welfare cost of this policy, with no 
administration costs is 13.3% of GNP.  As one would expect, the welfare losses in the presence of 
administration costs are higher, and this is true of all of the policies we consider. 
  The other policies considered are essentially tax reforms designed to replace either the capital or labor 
taxes starting from the base policy while keeping the revenue constant.  The welfare costs of all of 
these policies, as mentioned before, is computed with reference to the policy that raises the same 
amount of revenue by replacing all taxes with a lump-sum tax.  This policy is represented in the second 
row of the tables.  In all of the cases, a policy that replaces the labor or the capital tax with a lump sum 
tax leads to the largest welfare gains.  Again, the welfare improvements from this type of reform are 
larger in the presence of administration costs.  For example, replacing the labor tax with the lump-sum 
tax decreases the welfare costs from 13.3% to 8.10% in the economy without administration costs, an 
improvement of 5.2%, which is less than the 6.95% improvement experienced by the economy with 
20% administration costs, in which welfare costs decrease from 16.56% to 9.61% of GNP. 
  A striking difference that emerges from comparisons of the economies is the reversal of the ranking of 
reforms the replace labor or capital taxes with the consumption or the inflation tax.  In the presence of 
no administration costs, policies that replace the labor or capital tax with the consumption tax improve 
welfare to a greater extent than policies that replace these taxes with other distorting taxes.  In 
particular, replacing the capital tax with the consumption tax reduces welfare costs to a greater degree 
than could be achieved if it was replaced by the labor or inflation tax.  However, in the presence of RADHIKA LAHIRI 
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administration costs, reforms designed to replace the capital or labor taxes by revenue creation through 
seigniorage lead to larger welfare improvements compared to the consumption tax. 
   Figure 1 and 2 summarize the welfare consequences of some of the extreme policies in Tables 1 and 
2.  In these figures, we also look at the intermediate cases in which the capital and labor taxes are only 
partially replaced by consumption and inflation taxes.  The first panel of Figure 1 looks at welfare 
reduction from replacing the labor tax with the consumption an inflation taxes for the economy with no 
administration costs, and the second panel presents the economy with 10% administration costs.   As 
pointed out earlier, revenue replacement using the inflation tax leads to larger welfare gains in the 
presence of administration costs.  Figure 2 illustrates the same result in the case of the capital tax, 
although in relatively less striking form. 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
  In this paper we examined the welfare implications of monetary and fiscal policies in the presence of 
costly administration of taxes.   Based on our steady state analysis, some interesting qualitative and 
quantitative differences emerged relative to the standard case.  Firstly, the size of distortions associated 
with all types of taxes increases with costly administration.  The results here seem to suggest that 
economies with larger inefficiencies associated with tax administration are likely to experience larger 
benefits from such tax reforms.  Secondly, the ranking of reforms designed to replace the capital and 
labor taxes, with other less welfare-reducing forms of taxation is altered.   The implication of the model 
in this paper is that in economies with larger costs of administration, revenue replacement through 
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Table 1 
Steady State Welfare Effects of Policies with no Administration Costs 
Alternative Policies 
h τ   k τ   µ  
c τ   τ   Welfare Cost 
(% of GNP) 
Base Policy  .23  .50  0  0  0  13.3 
Replace all taxes with           
Lump  sum  0 0 0  0  .263  0 
Replace labor tax with           
Lump  sum  0 .50 0  0 .142  8.10 
Inflation  tax  0 .50  .293 0  0  12.43 
Consumption  tax  0 .50 0 .234 0  12.07 
Replace capital tax with           
Lump sum  .23  0  0  0  .065  4.07 
Labor tax  .343  0  0  0  0  7.77 
Inflation  tax  .23 0  .145 0  0  6.69 




Steady State Welfare Effects of Policies with 10% Administration Costs 
Alternative Policies 
h τ   k τ   µ  
c τ   τ   Welfare Cost 
(% of GNP) 
Base  Policy  .23  .50  0 0 0  14.91 
Replace all taxes with           
Lump sum  0  0  0  0  .2365  0 
Replace labor tax with           
Lump sum  0  .50  0  0  .1287  8.85 
Inflation tax  0  .50  .256  0  0  12.5785 
Consumption  tax  0  .50 0 .2344 0  13.6724 
Replace capital tax with           
Lump sum  .23  0  0  0  .0597  5.1169 
Labor  tax  .343  0  0 0 0  9.1591 
Inflation tax  .23  0  .1287  0  0  7.4010 











Steady State Welfare Effects of Policies with 20% Administration Costs 
Alternative Policies 
h τ   k τ   µ  
c τ   τ   Welfare Cost 
(% of GNP) 
Base Policy  .23  .50  0  0  0  16.5571 
Replace all taxes with           
Lump sum  0  0  0  0  .2103  0 
Replace labor tax with           
Lump sum  0  .50  0  0  .1158  9.6148 
Inflation tax  0  .50  .2214  0  0  12.7699 
Consumption  tax  0 .50 0 .2345 0  15.3125 
Replace capital tax with           
Lump sum  .23  0  0  0  .0542  6.1834 
Labor tax  .3434  0  0  0  0  10.5879 
Inflation tax  .23  0  .113  0  0  8.1502 
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Figure 2 
 
 
 